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Is the Collective Security Treaty Organization the Real Anti-NATO?
Although Western attention has focused on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a potential threat to Western influence in Eurasia, another institution, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), currently represents a more serious near-term challenge.
Last October, the leaders of the CSTO convened one of their most important summits in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. The assembled presidents and senior staff reached several important decisions that testify to the CSTO's expanding regional security ambitions. First, they adopted procedures formally authorizing members to conduct joint peacekeeping operations. Second, by reaffirming Moscow's willingness to sell arms to its CSTO allies on a subsidized basis, Russia has enhanced its dominant position in regional security affairs. Finally, the CSTO principals agreed to establish formal security ties with the SCO, creating the potential for substantial security cooperation between the two institutions for years to come.
(...) [The] most important agreement [at Dushanbe] involved the establishment of a joint CSTO peacekeeping force. The Russian government had been pushing for the creation of such a force since 2003, but it took Moscow several years to overcome the reluctance of other CSTO members to make such a commitment.
CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha said that CSTO peacekeepers could in theory deploy anywhere in the world, provided they receive appropriate authorization from the United Nations. In practice, the intent of most CSTO governments is to have a force suitable for deployment within the territories of existing member states. According to CSTO agreements, such use would not require the approval of the U.N. Security Council, where the United States and China have the right of veto. The CSTO secretariat would simply inform U.N. headquarters of its plans. (...)
Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Dushanbe summit to formalize Moscow's willingness to authorize the other CSTO members to purchase Russian weapons and homeland security equipment at the same prices paid by the Russian armed and internal security forces. The practical effect of this agreement is unclear given that Russia has already been providing CSTO militaries and special services with subsidized sales and training. (...)
More importantly, the signing ceremony highlights to the leaders of the other former Soviet republics the benefits of formally expressing obeisance to Moscow's primacy in security affairs. It is debatable whether the other governments most value the CSTO because it enhances their security or because it helps them obtain Russian defense subventions. By selling arms at reduced prices, moreover, Moscow will encourage the CSTO governments to continue their reliance on Russian-manufactured military equipment, which will both prolong their dependence on the Russian military industrial complex and facilitate possible joint CSTO operations by promoting standardization of the equipment, doctrine, and tactics employed by member countries' armed forces.
A final noteworthy development at the Dushanbe summit was the signing of a memorandum of understanding formally linking the CSTO with the SCO. There is considerable overlap in the memberships of the two organizations. Five of the seven CSTO member states are in the SCO, while five of the six SCO member states are in the CSTO. Since the spheres of responsibility of the two bodies also coincide, at least in the security arena, the agreement enables them to cooperate on a number of security issues, including countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other transnational criminal activity.
(...) Improving defense interoperability between the two institutions would make it easier to carry out a collective military operation in Central Asia, since Chinese forces could better interface with the CSTO. It would not, however, alter the fundamental disparity between Russia and China. Moscow could still organize a joint military intervention in Central Asia under CSTO's auspices without Beijing's approval. (...)
Thus far, NATO governments have declined to deal with the CSTO as a collective organization for fear of providing legitimacy to what they see as a Moscow-dominated institution. Instead, they continue to focus on engagement opportunities directly with the organization's individual members.
NATO's stance might warrant reassessment in light of the CSTO's growing influence in Eurasia. This month, Bordyuzha announced plans to extend CSTO-SCO cooperation this year to encompass other important Eurasian multinational organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Community, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. NATO could find itself painfully isolated in Central Asia if such an institutional constellation takes shape.
