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The Comparative Development of International Institutions in Europe
Today Europe is not just a stronghold of transnational cooperation, but a devoted adherent of pan-European values and the principle of “unity in diversity” (the official motto of the European Union). But how has such transformation occurred to the birthplace of invasive Realpolitik and unforgiving power rivalries? The first significant manifestation of this change can be traced back to the period after World War II when failed interwar multilateralism was replaced by an unprecedented success in the development of international institutions.
Different approaches to this issue exist and all of them provide a good explanation for one or more aspects of the difference between the interwar and the postwar international status quo. However, the most comprehensive paradigmatic approach, encompassing even some of the controversies of international interaction during the analyzed periods, is provided by the institutional paradigm. Institutions can be powerful mechanisms providing the structural means of successfully achieving grand-scale objectives, but when badly constructed, they may fatally fail to contain obstructive elements. Empirical example of the former is the successful path of economic integration in Europe after 1945, and of the latter: the inherent instability of the international order after World War I, when the lack of implementation mechanisms and the overall weakness of the League of Nations accumulate antagonism instead of appeasing it.
In regard to the League of Nations, a slightly different emphasis than the one used here is put by scholar Martin Kitchen (Collective Security, Disarmament and the League, in Europe Between the Wars, 2006). Kitchen does discuss in detail the failure of the League and the way it relates to unsuccessful multilateral agreements, yet, his approach is based more on the notion of countries acting in their own self interest and within the framework of balance of power politics. This power-based approach is undoubtedly relevant to the interwar period, but it is hard to apply to the process of European integration during the Cold War. Why would a power-seeking state partially give up sovereignty for the sake of cooperation with its arch rivals? Franco-German antagonism has its roots far back in history, yet, it is exactly France and Germany who spearhead the consolidated efforts for European integration. Indeed, the power paradigm does focus on extremely important aspects of the development of international interaction, but power-seeking impulses can be substantially altered depending on the institutional framework within which they take place. Thus, although state power does exert influence on domestic and international institutions, it is the institutional framework which can bring about changes or stalemate, ameliorate or contribute to worsening certain international conflicts.
The development of international institutions can be conditionally divided into three stages: early plans for international cooperation, awkward initial steps, and successful development. The first stage belongs almost entirely to the realm of ideas and designs for international cooperation (For Abbe de Sully’s Grand Design and other more prominent projects for European unity see The Idea of Europe, in Understanding the European Union, by John McCormick, 2005). The impulse for creating a vast international institution which is to serve the purpose of European unification goes as far as several centuries back in time. What undermines the establishment of external cooperation is, of course, the constant military conflicts, but also the institutional structure of European states. The dominant institution until well into the XX century in Europe remains the monarchy. For instance, as Frederic Morton sophisticatedly portrays it, Austrian monarchy is an anachronistic institution which can hardly handle the complexity of modern interaction between a state and its people (Thunder at Twilight: Vienna 1913-1914, 2001). With decorum and etiquette still reflecting a will to dominate over the others and contempt for giving up even the most insignificant symbols of status, it is hard to imagine such an institution cooperating with other similar to it entities for an idealistic and elusive concept like unification. As irrelevant to the interwar period as it might seem, this initial phase is of great importance for the explanation of an important aspect of the institutional paradigm: path-dependence.
Path-dependence refers to the enduring nature of some institutional constructs and their tendency to remain unchanged, even when external factors suggest they ought to. It can be argued that interwar multilateralism fails, because the path-dependence of the pre-World War I order still does not allow for the ambitious goals of international cooperation and antimilitary efforts to be fulfilled. Furthermore, the exercise in creating an essentially new type of institution as the League of Nations is undermined by the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure the realization of its intentions. As Kitchen reveals in his book, the League is more of a forum where the great powers can express their demands for reparations and action against Germany rather than an effectual mechanism which can provoke international cooperation, in the stead of pre-war balance of power conflict. Institutions also fail at the national level, creating an imbalance, reflected on the transnational scale. The Weimar Republic’s inability to resolve the problems of the German state after the Great War and the institutionalization of communist ideology after the Revolution in Russia are only two examples of domestic institutional changes which later have implications for instability at the international level. Even despite this instability, the path-dependence of already institutionalized state behavior endures at the cost of new institutional impulses: old antagonisms are preserved and international institutions are unable to exert any significant power.
It is after 1945 that fundamental differences begin to emerge in the status quo and alter substantially the structure and level of influence of international institutions. One might argue that such a major change in European institutions contradicts their previous path-dependence and discredits the institutional paradigm as a whole. This is a wrong assumption: the fact that path-dependence suggests a long-term endurance does not necessarily make it eternal and irreplaceable. Usually institutional path-dependence is initiated by a fundamentally important event, crucial to the establishment of a new kind of institutional order: for example, the introduction of the American Constitution. Thus, switching to a new path-dependence is possible, but only when a substantial change in the status quo necessitates it. The Second World War is by all means an extreme example of such a substantial change. Combined with the emergence of the global communist threat, it reveals the inherent flaws of the old institutional arrangement. Thus, it introduces a new path-dependence which is more integration-oriented and becomes the impetus for both internal and external institutional changes throughout Europe.
The fundamental difference between the failed multilateral efforts and the new impulses for integration is the nature of the newly emerged path-dependence. Instead of externally imposed, the transnational interaction at the broader European level is a conscious and consolidated collective effort. In order for it to have optimum effect, various types of organizations emerge: from economic (ECSC, and later the EEC) to military and political ones (NATO, UN, etc). Their elaborate structures are a significant shift from the lack of real ability to act and obscure concepts during the interwar period. The 1927 Kellogg-Briand pact, for instance, does nothing more than denouncing war and fails to go beyond mere idealistic rhetoric to prevent it (Martin Kitchen).
Instead of political cooperation, which involves far too many sensitive questions of sovereignty and national interests, the European Economic Community (EEC) chooses the most reliable basis for international interaction: institutionalizing economic integration. Since economics permeates all aspects of the state and people’s lives, cooperation soon spills over to other areas (John McCormick). It would have been unable to do so without the right institutional premises allowing it harmonization of standards, regulations, etc. (John McCormick). McCormick supports this thesis by pointing out that the granted free movement of capital, goods and people meets serious obstacles, which make it almost impossible to achieve unless technical barriers and regulations are dealt with. Had not the EEC gradually developed and enhanced its institutional structure to meet the ever emerging new needs of integration, it is hard to imagine the European project would have developed beyond a mere free-trade zone or customs union.
Alongside economic institutions, the new European order also necessitates the emergence of enhanced international institutions in the realm of security and political cooperation. NATO and the UN develop an institutional legacy which was roughly outlined by the League of Nations. Furthermore, NATO provides a firm stronghold for Western European countries against the threat of the Communist East. With the North Atlantic Pact founded to consolidate security policy, the division between East and West is no longer marked by an “invisible Iron Curtain” (as Winston Churchill famously called it), but by the institutionalization of this ideological division. Furthermore, with UN’s Security Council as an implementation organ, the drawbacks of previous attempts for international political and military cooperation are (at least in theory) eliminated and granted a certain degree of efficiency.
The Eastern bloc in turn responds with the Warsaw Pact, which is essentially an attempt for institutionalizing the antagonism with the Western ideological rival. Paradoxically, while Western countries seek protection in NATO, some countries in the Eastern bloc need to be protected from the pact they are part of. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the infamous Prague Spring in 1968 are but two examples of the willingness of Warsaw Pact signatories to break away from the institution and the aggressive reaction they meet (Cracks In the Wall, by Hitchcock). Coercion is not a reliable basis for faith in the endurance and success of an institution. The lack of faith in the structure which controlled its Eastern and Central European satellites, the inherent flaws of the communist system and institutions turn the Russian path-dependence away from the comfortable realms of European integration. Having the counterpoint of the Eastern bloc’s disadvantaged social, economic and political position was another reason for the West to deepen its integration efforts. Somewhat paradoxically, the West’s succeeding in these efforts managed to undermine the legitimacy of the Communist regime and its institutions, and nourish dissent.
Leaders like Vaclav Havel see the culmination dissent in the formation of a “genuine community” (The Power of the Powerless, by Vaclav Havel, 1985). Although this community is not intended as an institutional structure, Havel admits that the “efforts to bring about the interpenetration of the independent life of society with the existing structures, usually begin (…) with the quiet institutionalization of this life on and around the periphery of the official structures. In other words, it was a gradual process of social awakening.” Striving for this awakening, it is not an accident that after the end of the Cold War Czechoslovakia, along with Poland and Hungary, are to become the leading candidates from the whole region for integration into the European Union.
In short, the integration of the latter three states as well as the rest of the continent is closely related to not merely ideological convictions, economical interests or a new power “redistributing” to a greater, integrated Europe. Although these factors are of crucial importance, without an institutional framework to harness them into a coordinated effort for integration, it is hard for any of them to fully explain all aspects of the development of international institutions in Europe. The change in path-dependence after the failure of multilateralism in the interwar period brings about success during the Cold War. It proves the ability of the institutional paradigm to encompass both negative and positive trends in a complex, yet, sophisticated and comprehensive way.
Konstantina Vasileva
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