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The AU’s Successes and Failures to Date in Human Rights and Peacekeeping Conflicts
Introduction
The creation of the European Union, the merging of numerous economies and the unifying force of a single currency have given hope to other continents looking for more unity and stability. Africa is one of these continents which have experienced colonial domination, witnessed their resources being sucked out for the development of the colonial powers, and even if the African continent has gained independence, with it came an air of despair fuelled by ethnic/racial conflict, civil wars, corruption, dictatorship and extreme poverty. This hope, coming from many Pan-Africanist leaders, played itself out firstly in the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, largely the brainchild of Kwame Nkrumah. This was a step in the creation of an African Unity committee that was supposed to lay the stepping stones to the final objective, a unified African continent with all the colonial barriers gone along with the ethnic/racial conflict, wars and dependence on the previous colonial powers (The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peace Building and Development, by Tim Murithi, 2005). However, the OAU was not working as well as the leaders had anticipated, even with the signing of the Treaty of Abuja in 1991. Thus, in 2002 there was the inauguration of the African Union (AU), which was meant to be a more realistic organisation in the achievement of a unified African continent (Murithi). Since its foundation, the AU has faced numerous conflicts, from civil wars in the DRC, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) to the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Where the AU had been able to achieve successes, the outcome was lukewarm, and no doubt failures are quite common and still linger on to the present day. In this essay, I will analyse the successes and failures of the AU with the use of case studies of different crises in conflict resolution and the protection of human rights, and most importantly, I will put forward the argument that the AU is proving itself ineffective without the help of external players.
The Successes of the African Union in Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Protection
Despite the reality that the AU has a lot of negative connotations to its name, especially in terms of ensuring security on the African continent and protecting human rights, it will be unfair to dismiss the partial successes that it achieved even if with limited resources and even more shameful little support from other African member states at times. Determined to make a better impression about its abilities in bringing security and peace, the African Union adopted many new acts in its constitution, especially the ones dealing with intervention in member states where there is a clear threat to human security, especially with the haunted memories of the genocide in Rwanda where the OAU left the Tutsis at the mercy of the Hutus. The successes of the AU had been limited due to many restraints, especially the lack of support and commitment from member states and personal politics influencing the decisions to be taken. The following case studies will help outline the obstacles that the AU faces to achieve a little bit of reward.
The Comoros
If the African Union has been busy trying to calm the current tension on the African continent, be it in civil conflicts or regional confrontations, another cry for help from the African Union came from the Comoros islands in the Indian Ocean. This small island state with important ties with France (Mayotte is a French department) was plunged once more into political turmoil as yet another coup occurred with the aim of seizing power (Troubled Paradise: The Mixed Success of the African Union’s Intervention in the Comoros, in World Defense Review, by J. Peter Pham, 03 April 2008). The cause of the crisis goes back to the fact that the one island Mayotte that voted to stay a French department prospered while the other smaller independent islands were left at the mercy of the largest independent island. After much negotiation and under the supervision of South Africa, there was a decentralisation of political power, but this did not last long as in very recent times another crisis erupted after there were some issues with the election (Pham).
The political leader that won the 2006 election could not take his place as the current president refused to step down, and thus the AU intervened to put an end to the political crisis. The AU came to an agreement with France to put an embargo on the Indian Ocean Archipelago to stop the movement of both people and goods. It was clear that the AU had no intention of allowing the current president to stay in power illegally while his opponent had won fair and square, and thus the decision was taken to deploy the AU peace-keeping force to the Comoros. The AU “mandated that the African Union Electoral Security and Assistance Mission to the Comoros deploy in Anjouan in order to facilitate the restoration of the authority of the Union in Anjouan” (Pham) and the more than 1000 AU soldiers, mostly from Tanzania, Senegal, Sudan and Libya, were no match to the 300 ill-trained policemen from Anjouan. On March 25, 2008, the AU troops seized major infrastructure of the island and the illegal president fled to Mayotte where the French flew him to Reunion Island while considering his plea for asylum (Pham).
This might have been seen as a great achievement for the AU in restoring some kind of stability to a country that has been politically unstable for quite some time. But the question I want to ask is how long this peace will last? Will it last as long as AU’s commitment and contribution to such crises? To further the analysis on why the AU was successful in this matter, the question of international players is very essential in understanding how the AU can actually achieve success. The Comoros had really important ties with France, and with its military expertise, France stepped in not just because it wanted to protect civilian lives, but also to keep its economic and diplomatic interests safe. If France had not intervened, the situation could have somewhat been different since we are aware that the AU troops are just observers and the armed rebel group could have only been dealt with by the French army who have the right to use physical military power in their department (Pham).
Burundi
The African continent has for a few centuries been under intense tension, often erupting in regional or civil crisis, causing instability, misunderstandings, prolonged hatred, mistrust and great loss of human rights. Burundi is one of these African states that has also been unstable for quite some time and the conclusion of a UN observer that this country was “on the brink” (The African Union’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia, in African Security Review, by Tim Murithi, March 2008) urged the AU to set up a mission to prevent yet another crisis from erupting. So in 2003, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AWIB) was launched with 3000 troops, mostly from Ethiopia and Mozambique, deployed there with the main objective of “monitoring peace and providing security” (Murithi). On a level of fairness, it is essential here to give credit to the AU for trying to suppress tensions that could well have ended up in yet another violent conflict. So the AWIB’s aim of “engaging in peace building through the prevention of violent conflict and trying to lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction” (Murithi) was proved to be effective, but it is of utmost importance that the AU keeps on supporting this mission so as not to allow a relapse into violent confrontations and the destruction of any hope for peace.
The AU was somehow able to make the situation more stable for the UN to come in and assist with the transformation process, especially towards the adoption of democratic means of ruling. However, there is something hidden behind these jobs well done by the AU and yet it is the role played by other external actors. The UN, a much more powerful organ with more funding, came into play to cool down the tension and give Burundi the chance to enjoy some kind of peace and encourage economic opportunities for all (Murithi). We might well hope that both the AU and the UN continue with their efforts so that lasting peace in Burundi can be obtained and safeguarded.
Even if these case studies had been used to illustrate some of the partial successes that the AU managed to acquire, there are other instances where the AU was able to bring some relief. In the civil confrontation in Ivory Coast, the AU was able to help stabilise the situation but it was France again that was the key figure in negotiating the peace accord, leaving the AU red-faced and humiliated, especially in the face of those extremist Pan-Africanists who want an Africa free of her past colonial ties (The Crisis in Ivory Coast, by Jacques Lhuillery, 2003). In recent times in Darfur, the AU was heavily criticised for not doing enough, but then again the AU was able to corporate effectively with the United Nations Organisations to bring some relief, even if for a little while, and then the violent outburst overshadowed the efforts of the AU (Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur, by Eric Reeves, November 2005).
The Failures of the African Union in Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Protection
The moment that the word human rights is mentioned in present time in the African context, at once the attention is diverted towards the ongoing crisis in Sudan, especially in the Darfur region, and of course the political breakdown in Zimbabwe. This section of the essay will firstly look at the crisis in Darfur, followed by an explanation on Zimbabwe.
Sudan (Darfur)
In current news events, one crisis that has gained enormous attention is still the crisis in the Sudan region of Darfur. Similar to the crisis in Rwanda more than a decade ago, the world once more witnessed the great losses of innocent lives while international and regional organisations, which had sworn to protect these lives, stood by helpless. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was supposed to help decrease the tension in Sudan and ensure that the peace they will acquire will last and innocent blood will not be shed (Reeves). However, their inability to deal with such a crisis leaves little to the imagination of the power of the AU as a whole to counter security issues on the continent and contribute towards successful peace-building operations (Reeves). According to Reeves, the inability of the AU to deal with the crisis in Darfur lies in the AU’s dishonesty and lack of interest in looking at the reality that they are faced with; instead they chose to view the crisis as a short-term issue that will easily subdue with time and the AU will not have to spend a dime or deploy its already very limited troops. These assumptions can be justified with the fact that many African Union member states rarely make their financial contributions to the organisation or even take this organ seriously. It has simply become a playground for those seeking some kind of attention, which is in fact destroying the ambitious foundation laid down by the Pan-Africanist forefathers.
However, the AU came under harsh scrutiny as the crisis in Darfur erupted in an ethnic-cleansing frenzy. Despite the deployment of about 5000 troops in Darfur, these troops just acted as wall flowers as the massacre of civilians and intimidation of humanitarian workers raged on (Reeves). Even if these troops were to directly confront the rebels, the kind of arms that they used would put them in very vulnerable positions since they were ill-equipped compared to their enemy. If the AU failed the people of Darfur militarily, politically they were just as much of a failure. The AU was unable to confront and demand that the Khartoum regime stops its support for “it’s massively destabilizing Janjaweed militia proxies” (Reeves). The main point here is that if the AU was unable to deal with an abusive region, then the AU could not deal with issues in that country effectively, and even more find resolutions for a whole continent.
The AU even refused to move the next AU summit that was supposed to be held in Khartoum in protest, neither did the AU use its political organ to ask Khartoum to show respect and stop its harassment and abuse of both the AU operations and other humanitarian activities in Darfur (Reeves). The key point of the article is that the AU is seen as a farce by many abusive regimes to the extent that the AU falls under their command with little power to deal with these regimes effectively. If militarily the AU is not that advanced and able, its political structure and diplomatic stance are even less glamorous. Khartoum has been able to keep many international aid agencies out and it is not surprising that the African Union could not do their job properly. This is a reality that the African continent has to face to the extent of understanding that Africa is a very vulnerable continent and the AU needs to unify itself before trying to unify the African continent In this way, they could operate more effectively as they would be working better together in not only bringing peace, but also securing that peace.
Zimbabwe
The reality in Zimbabwe is even more critical even if the world is trying to give that crisis a blind eye maybe until it explodes into a serious humanitarian and political volcano of destruction and loss like in the Darfur region in Sudan. There have been ongoing violent abuses, intimidation and mistreatment of opposition politicians and their supporters in Zimbabwe, but the AU had made it clear that it “has more serious issues to deal with” (Zimbabwe: AU Slams Human Rights Record, IRIN, 2006). Former South African president Thabo Mbeki, a close friend of Zimbabwe’s Dictator Robert Mugabe, questions “why the West is so concerned with Zimbabwe but says nothing about other African emergencies like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where some three million people died in a civil war” (Africa Rejects Action on Zimbabwe, BBC, 2007). The one thing to get out of this kind of behaviour is a political alliance that has prevented the AU from working more effectively on dealing with the political instability in Zimbabwe, and since Mbeki was the president of the AU, there were little prospects of the AU dealing with human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, rather the issue was ignored. The AU is supposed to have a more interventionist role in African states where there is a clear threat of a humanitarian crisis and it is not mystery that other African crises are being used to divert attention from the reality in Zimbabwe (Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union, by Rachel Murray, 2004).
Only in recent times was the AU forced to look at the crisis in Zimbabwe with more urgency, and that mostly came to be because international sponsors of the AU were putting intense pressure on the adoption of more serious attitude towards Zimbabwe. As a result of this, in 2006 the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), which is an institution of the AU, adopted a new resolution to look at the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe (IRIN). This was to put pressure on Zimbabwe and “test the African leaders’ capacity and political will to deal with African problems as well as having the opportunity to show they have the ability and are committed to deal with such issues” (IRIN). However, this was seen as a camouflage by the AU which was trying to cheat the world into believing that they were trying to sort the situation, and funny enough, the leader of the ACHPR was made to leave before completing his work because, according to Zimbabwean authorities, his papers were not in order (IRIN)! From then on, the whole issue was given a silent note even if in the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe the ruling party ZANU-PF abused human rights and threatened opponents while South Africa gave Mugabe a slap on the back and called the election genuine, which proved once more that the AU cannot be taken seriously alongside its disrespectful leaders (Amnesty International).
Moreover, Zimbabwe and Darfur may just be two of the main obvious failures of the AU to provide security and protect basic human rights but there are other situations nicely outlined by Amnesty International, which is an organisation working to provide security for the protection of human rights on a global scale. Amnesty International has called on the AU on numerous occasions to deal with human rights issues not just in obvious countries like Zimbabwe, but has also voiced out concerns for places like Togo, Sierra Leone (mainly to help with the rehabilitation of ex-child soldiers), Somalia, and Niger (especially with the public stoning of women) (Amnesty International). Prior to the AU assembly meeting in June-July this year, Amnesty International called upon the AU to prove itself capable in dealing with human rights abuses and making use of the many organs it has to ensure successes in providing security and hope to the vulnerable (Amnesty International). A key demand made by Amnesty was to allow individuals and NGOs direct access to court rather than keep that luxury in the hands of states and governments in power. For instance, who will expect Mugabe to go forward and claim that there are human rights abuses in Zimbabwe when he himself is the perpetrator? If financial contribution was an issue, structural problems also contributed to the failures of the AU in doing an effective job and gaining some more respect and acceptance. The AU has a Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights but little has been done to see how effective it is, especially now, with the calling of Charles Taylor, the Liberian ex-leader, to trial for crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone (Amnesty International).
If Amnesty International has to be the one pointing out the human rights issues that the AU has to deal with, clearly the AU is not keeping itself aware of what is going on on the African continent; instead, it is busy negotiating plans to keep certain things quiet, especially in Zimbabwe, fuelled by South Africa’s relationship with Mugabe. In Togo, for instance, the majority of people are suffering in silence after yet another military coup and the AU has shown interest in helping out with the transition but very little is being done to help with the human rights issues, especially political pressure exerted on the vast population (Amnesty International). Central to that, Amnesty International has argued that the African leaders dealing with the AU should put aside their personal alliance and work to better the organization especially when it comes to the question of protecting human rights and bringing to justice those that have abused these rights, like Charles Taylor and clearly Mugabe, rather than glorify these African leaders as great freedom fighters who have freed their respective countries from colonialism (Amnesty International).
The Successes vs. The Failures
It will no doubt be very easy to point the fingers at the AU and accuse it of being a farce and a play puppet to many African countries involved in abuses of their subjects. But it will be wrong not to give the AU some kind of credit for some of their aims for the African Union. Cilliers, for instance, focuses on the restructure of the AU to improve on such things like giving them more power to intervene in a particular country and creating a court to deal with human rights (Towards the African Union, in African Security Review, by Jakkie Cilliers, 2001). However, the reality that more needs to be accomplished, even with little resources and devotion, remains.
The successes of the AU, if or more clearly partial successes, have many underlined facts that give us an insight into what the AU is missing. In the instances when the AU was able to halt a crisis, for example in the Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire, an external power was present to smooth things out both financially and militarily as well as to lose their credit to the AU. The AU is very much dependent on external donors to achieve some success; for example, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AWISOM) benefited from a € 15-million aid from the European Union and the UK also pledged to help out with € 1.3 million (Murithi, 2008). Even with the food crisis in Zimbabwe, it is still international organizations, such as the Red Cross and Amnesty International, who are bringing relief to the desperate people (Amnesty International).
The failures of the AU cannot be pointed just to the structural problems of this young organisation; the attitudes of AU leaders are just as important to ensure that the AU achieved its aim. Murithi (2005) explains that one of the key reasons why African leaders have not been able to take their place and make a difference, especially in terms of peace building and security, goes all the way to corruption especially fuelled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Murithi (2005) goes further to argue that the “ineffectiveness of the OAU arose out of the altruism of its founders, who deliberately created an institution to serve their political interests, rather than the interests of their subjects,” and when that was proved to be true, the AU came into operation with much promise, but can the AU do a much more effective work? According to Murithi (2005), the AU has been able to achieve certain successes in its structures, such as the roles of women and the Human Rights Protection Act. However, the key things that African leaders need to consider are to make themselves more concerned with all the issues affecting the African continent rather than just fill up their pockets and elevate their status; Murithi (2008) also argues that for effective peace building to occur, the leaders of the AU should consider mediation with “sub-national and non-state actors.”
One of the most interesting points made by Murithi (2005) is that Africa should go back to its traditional values to find solutions to deal with certain prevailing issues, especially in terms of human rights violations as it was tried out in Somalia and seemed to have a glimpse of hope for success. But Murithi (2008) made it clear above that the successes of the AU and the whole African continent will come when “the African leaders shed their subservience to the west and their predatory tendencies, which have kept many African people from enjoying the profits of African’s resources.” Also, there is a need to include civil societies in the running of African states and the encouragement of participatory democracy; then some successes might be achieved.
If those have been the hopes and dreams of Tim Murithi, in the book The African Union and Its Institutions (2008), the argument is somewhat similar. The book stresses that African leaders should be as generous to the African Union as they are to their corruption buddies and prove their commitments to the AU by taking more seriously their contribution to the AU and step up to their responsibility. Murithi (2005) also points out a key issue with the African leaders in the AU: he argues that before the leaders want to spread democracy to African states, they themselves should practice it by getting themselves elected to the position of leader at the AU. Most of these leaders were not elected by the people of their countries; instead, they were chosen and many have pursued personal interests and reacted in such a way that jeopardised the whole movement to find effective solutions, such as South Africa’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe and Mbeki’s great friendship with Mugabe, who is seen as a great hero amongst many Pan-Africanist leaders also involved with the AU (Murithi, 2005).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the successes and the failures of the AU both point at the direction of letting us know where the AU is heading. The dependence of the AU on external donors to launch its missions is a slap in the face for the so-called Pan-Africanists who want a break-away from that dependence grasp, urging Africans to find solutions to their own problems rather than run back to European states like incapables. The African leaders should not just talk the talk but they must also walk the walk as well as practise what they preach, starting with allowing all African people to contribute towards crucial decision making and selecting the AU representatives. All Africans on the African continent should stand up and take their place as leaders as well in helping to solve conflicts and bringing relief to their brothers rather than ignoring the situation, hoping someone else will patch the pieces for them. The AU should be made to exist as an organization for all rather than a play club for the rich who use it as they want and camouflage the actions of their friends by diverting attention to other issues. As long as African leaders act the way they do with only an organisation, the horror of what they will do if the African Continent does unify is unimaginable. Unify the AU and make it work effectively before stepping out to take the responsibility of ruling a whole continent with a sole government, a sole currency and a sole identity.
Patsy Moustache
Mandy Patsy Moustache is from the Seychelles Islands and majors in Political Science and History at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. She has successfully completed her Advanced Level (A Level) in French, History and Law from Cambridge University, UK as well as one year of fellowship at Bard College in New York, USA as part of Bard’s Program in International Education (PIE). Patsy is interested in the distribution of free education, youth and women development and empowerment, gender equality, political freedom, human rights protection, and the eradication of poverty, unfair trade agreements, state abuse of power, child abuse, racial/ ethnic/ religious tensions, substance abuse. She is determined to pursue her postgraduate degrees in Political Science and Public Administration.
